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THREE CASES ON POSSESSION
THREE CASES ON POSSESSION-SOME FURTHER
OBSERVATIONS
BY JOSEPH F. FRANCIS
Mr. A. L. Goodhart has, in the current number of the Cam-
bridge Law Journal,' made some very interesting comments on
three well known cases on possession 2 as involving rights of find-
'Vol. 3, No. 2, 1928. Without implying the contrary, this paper will
hardly be intelligible until Mr. Goodhart's paper is first read.
For those who do not have access to the Journal here follows a brief sum-
mary of the author's conclusions upon the three famous finder's cases (cited
in note 2 below). As to Bridges v. Hawkesworth he finds five distinct the-
ories to support the finder as against the possessing (occupying) landown-
er: (1) The court's no intentional depositing of the notes-that is, they
were lost; (2) Lord Russell's public access; (3) Justice Holmes' no intent
to exclude because no intent to exclude from place where notes were found;
(4) Sir Frederick Pollock's, no de facto control, for any one could pick up
the notes; (5) Sir John Salmond's no animus, since no knowledge of their
existence. The author's own theory is that the case is wrongly decided be-
cause the average finder does recognize some control in the landowner by
usually tendering the property to him for the true owner and because the
landowner has a general intent to exclude strangers from anything of value
on his premises even though it be found in a place where the public is in-
vited. By implication the author sets up some principles of possession in-
volving intent and control. The last four theories he finds invalid and mis-
leading because these are not the theories of the court deciding the case.
In regard to the case of South Staffordshire Water Company v. Shannon
Mr. Goodhart finds two theories, a valid one and an invalid one: (1) the
court's theory, whereby the landowner has possession of the rings because
possession of the land carries with it possession of everything attached to
or under the land; and (2) Sir John Salmond's theory, that the landlord
has possession because the rings were found by the servant, who found not
for himself but for his employer.
Likewise in Elwes v. Brigg Gas Company the author finds two theories,
one correct and one incorrect: (1) the court's theory that the plaintiff was
in possession of the boat because he was in possession of the ground; and
(2) Sir John Salmond's theory, that the plaintiff is entitled to the boat be-
cause the defendant was a trespasser. Sir John Salmond's theories in both
these cases are considered invalid because they are not the theories enun-
ciated by the courts deciding these cases.
Finally the author rather half-heartedly suggests a distinction between
the Bridges case and the other two cases in that in both of the latter cases
the lost articles were found in or under the soil, but he is not himself im-
pressed with this distinction.
" Bridges v. Hawkesworth, (1851) 15 Jur. 1079, 21 L. J. Q. B. 75; Elwes
v. Brigg Gas Co., (1886) 38 Ch. Div. 562; South Staffordshire Water Co. v.
Sharman, [1896] 2 Q. B. 44.
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ers. He rather earnestly takes to task learned judges and emi-
nent text-writers 3 for "seeing things" in judgments that are not
there. He finds Mr. Justice Holmes "slightly misleading, ' 4 Sir
Frederick Pollock with an "interesting theory * * * not part
of the ratio decidendi of the case,"' and Sir John Salmond's
theory "contrary to the established principle of the English Law
on the subject."' 6 With great diffidence Mr. Goodhart advances
his own theory, i.e., that the Bridges case is "incorrectly de-
cided."7
Although Mr. Goodhart disclaims any attempt to state a gen-
eral theory of possession, there are to be found in his paper
many interesting assumptions, implicit and explicit, on his
theory of possession and on his theory of judicial decision. With
great diffidence and with the greatest respect for Mr. Goodhart
it is proposed in this paper to examine just a few of these as-
sumptions with the view of casting some doubt on their validity
or usefulness. 8
Quoting Viscount Dunedin" and Professor Wambaugh,2° Mr.
Goodhart assumes that "a case is a precedent for a doctrine on
which the judges based their judgment; it is not a precedent for
a doctrine which was not in the minds of the judges."' Thus he
rather "cavalierly" disposes of one of the most difficult and
most vital questions in Anglo-American law today, i.e., What
does a case decide? What is decision and what is dictum?'2
'Op. cit, note 1 supra, p. 196.
'




'C. J. Keyser, THINKING ABOUT TINKING (1926), pp. 73-76: "Selection
of postulates is one thing. Detection of postulates is another. * * *
The proposition, that all of our empirical thinking involves essential refer-
ence to postulates despite the fact that when we are engaged in such think-
ing people are for the most part utterly unconscious of any such reference,
is very sweeping. It is indeed tremendous. Nevertheless it is true."
Walter W. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law (1927), 13 American Bar
Association Journal 303, 306.
'Great Western R. Co. v. Owners of S. S. Mostyn, [1928] A. C., 1. c. 73.
"THE STIUY OF CASES, p. 24.
Op. cit. note 1 supra, p. 195.
Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis (1927), 14 American Bar
Association Journal 71, 159. This paper contains a very searching and
critical analysis of this whole question.
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Once we choose our postulates we fix our destiny. If we assume
that the moon is made of green cheese then we must agree,
among other things, that green cheese is that of which the moon
is made. If we do not like our conclusions we are always free to
change our postulates. 12 8 One cannot quarrel much with Mr.
Goodhart's conclusionA once he admits his postulates. I take it
that no postulate is self-evident and to doubt, occasionally, a
proposition that is often taken to be self-evident is a wholesome
exercise. 13
The first case considered by Mr. Goodhart is the famous case
of Bridges v. Hawkesworth.14 The facts of this case are sum-
marized-and to summarize is always to omit-by Patteson, J.:
"The notes which are the subject of this action were evidently
dropped by mere accident in the shop of the defendant by the
owner of them. The facts do not warrant the supposition that
they had been deposited there intentionally * * *. The
plaintiff found them on the floor * * *"15 Other facts are
given by the reporter. The plaintiff handed the notes to the de-
fendant to keep them to be delivered to the owners. The de-
fendant advertised them; three years elapsed; the owner was not
found. The plaintiff offered to pay the defendant for the ex-
pense of advertising and to indemnify him against any claim in
respect to the notes. The defendant refused to deliver the notes
to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff brought an action in the Coun-
ty Court. The judge decided for the defendant, and the plain-
tiff appealed to the Court of Queen's Bench where the judgment
was reversed.
Now what did that case decide? It decided what are the legal
consequences of the facts of that case, of course, and more. How
much more is the real question. It decided what are the legal
consequences of any other facts exactly like those of the instant
case. But this is not saying very much, for no two cases are
exactly alike.16 There are always some differences, as in the
"a Although we are not so free to change the world in which we live.
""To have doubted one's own first principles is the mark of a civilized
man." Mr. Justice Holmes, COLLECTED ESSAYS (1921), p. 307. See also
Keyser, op. cit., p. 54. ff.
" Note 2, supra.
" At p. 1082, Jur.
"Oliphant, op. cit. note 12 supra, p. 72.
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parties, time, etc. So, if we are to have any useful method of
stare decisis, the case must decide more. Some generalization
and abstraction must be involved. The question is, How broad
and in what direction? Does the case decide what the case up-
on which it is based" seems to decide, i.e., "The finder of a lost
article is entitled to it as against all the parties except the real
owner?" This rule is clearly too broad-if this were the only
difficulty involved. But there are other obvious difficulties, Who
is a finder? This in turn raises the difficulties of Who comes
first in possession? and What is lost property?' Then is it not
quite possible that these terms have different meanings for dif-
ferent purposes as, for instance, purposes of procedure, purposes
of criminal responsibility, etc. ?18a Does the case decide that the
finding of goods on the land of another in a place of public access
gives the finder better rights than any one else but the true own-
er? Mr. Goodhart argues that it does not, because this is not
the ground upon which the learned Justice placed his decision.'0
Lord Russell is taken to task2o for attributing to the decision of
Patteson, J., that "the place in which they were found makes all
the legal difference." A further objection is found in the diffi-
culty involved in drawing a line between a place of public access
and a place of public exclusion.21 The implication back of the
latter objection will be considered later.
There seem to be two plausible answers to the first objection
in the nature of both a confession and an avoidance. It is true
that Patteson, J., did say in the Bridges case, "the learned
[county] judge was mistaken in holding that the place in which
they were found makes any legal difference." It is submitted
that what the learned judge had in mind is this, "the place in
which they were found makes no legal difference in this case."
It is submitted that this is more probably his meaning because he
was dealing with the facts of the instant case and not those of
the Sharman case or the Elwes case or the scores of finder cases
that have since arisen. Be this as it may, does it follow that a
'Armory v. Delamirie (Nisi Prius 1722), 1 Strange 505.
R. W. Aigler (1922), 21 Mich. L. Rev. 664, 57 Am. L. Rev. 511.
"a This will be developed further later. See note 39.
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case cannot be a precedent for a doctrine which was not in the
mind of the judge when he made his decision? Generally cases
are not precedents for doctrines not involved in the facts of the
case and not in the mind of judge; but it is respectfully submit-
ted that where the doctrine is involved in the facts, although it
is not noticed in the arguments of counsel or in the opinion of
the judge and was not even in the mind of the judge, it may and
generally does become part of the decision and hence a precedent.
Whether it was noticed or not, the fact remains that these notes
were found on the floor of a shop to which the public had access.
Both judge and counsel may have sensed this, although it failed
to appear in their vocal behavior; but whether they did or did
not does not derogate from the fact that this parcel was found in
a place where the public was invited. If this fact is important
then it should be considered part of the decision of the case; if
not, then otherwise. It is trite that judges as well as other
human beings build wiser than they know and certainly act
wiser than they talk. One is more likely than not to give the
wrong reasons when justifying his conduct. We can always give
"good" reasons for our opinions or our conduct, but the "real"
reasons are seldom given and often could not, to save our lives,
be given.22 "What you do speaks so loud that I cannot hear
what you say" is as good a legal precept as it is a moral precept.
Professor Oliphant has ably pointed out how our law has aban-
doned the old wholesome method of stare decisis and adopted in
its stead the deleterious method of stare dictis, i.e., the following
of doctrines and principles rather than of what is in fact done
by the judges apart from what they have said.23  The effect of
these things, he says,24 "is to cause most of our students to re-
main intellectual infants with toothless gums too soft except for
munching elastic generalities with sophomoric serenity. * * *
Generalized abstractions are called 'principles' and these are
endowed with a reality of their own. Generalized statements,
when broad enough and old enough, transcend the world of time,
place, and circumstance to dwell in realms of universal reality."
J. H. Robinson, THE MIND IN THE MAKING, p. 42. John Dewey, Logical
Method and Law (1924), 10 Cornell L. Quar. 17.
Op. cit. note 12, p. 159.
lb., p. 76.
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So I should say that it is not what Patteson, J., said or failed to
say that determines what the Bridges case decides.24a
In commenting on Mr. Justice Holmes' discussion of the
B7idges case, especially the statement, "There can be no animus
domini unless the thing is known of; but an intent to exclude
others from it may be included in the larger intent to exclude
"a One can hardly touch the law at any point without finding examples.
Let us take an illustration from criminal law. In Rex v. Fenton (1830),
1 Lewin's Cr. Cas. 179, the defendants were charged with throwing stones
down a mine, breaking the scaffolding, in consequence of which the deceased
was killed in descending the mine. It was proved that these stones were
reasonably likely to break the scaffolding and that if it was broken death
was likely to ensue to persons using the corf. In other words, negligence
was found. Tindal, C. J., broadly lays down the rule: "If death ensues as
the consequence of a wrongful act, an act which the party who commits it
can neither justify nor excuse, it is not accidental death but manslaugh-
ter * * *. In the present instance, the act was one of mere wantonness
and sport, but still the act was wrongful, it was a trespass." Fifty-three
years later in the case of Regina v. Franklin (1883), 15 Cox C. C. 163, a
prisoner was charged with manslaughter in that he "took up a good-sized
box from the refreshment stall on the pier and wantonly threw it into the
sea. Unfortunately the box struck the deceased, C. P. Trechard, who was
at the moment swimming underneath, and so caused his death." The prose-
cution urged that apart from negligence this was sufficient to convict of
manslaughter, for the act done by the prisoner was an unlawful act, and
cited Fenton's case. Field, J., said, "The mere fact of a civil wrong com-
mitted by one person against another ought not to be used as an incident
which is a necessary step in a criminal case." There is nothing to indicate
that any such distinction existed in the mind of Tindal, C. J. Yet it would
n6t be urged that Field, J., has overruled the Fenton case or given an un-
warranted ratio decidendi of that case. But the end is not yet. The rule
now reads somewhat as follows: Anyone who kills another while engaged in
a criminally unlawful act is guilty of manslaughter. In Potter v. State
(1904), 162 Ind. 213, 70 N. E. 129, where the prisoner was playing with a
friend and accidentally killed him with a pistol which the prisoner was
carrying in violation of a statute against carrying concealed weapons,
Jordon, J., again modifies the rule of the Fenton case to read: Any one who
kills another in a criminally unlawful act that is the natural and necessary
result of that act is guilty of manslaughter. Hoke, J., in State v. Horton
(1905), 139 N. C. 588, 51 S. E. 945, where the prisoner killed a man while
hunting on the land of another without written consent as required by
statute, adds to the rule "and morally wrongful." What is "natural and
necessary" and what is "morally wrongful" will require many more modifi-
cations, no doubt. Can it be said that Tindal, J., had all these qualifications
in mind or that the Fenton case stands for more than is stated in the last
version of the rule of the case? To agree that these later judges are mak-
ing new law is not also to agree that the Fenton case stands for more or
less than the last version of the rule properly drawn from the facts of simi-
lar cases.
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others from the place where it is, without knowledge of the ob-
ject's existence," Mr. Goodhart observes: "In the judgment no
mention is made of the two different kinds of intent. It is not
clear that the question of intent was considered by the court al-
though it was discussed by counsel. Insofar as a ratio decidendi
can be extracted from the case it is that the parcel was not in the
shopkeeper's custody, because he owed no duty to the true owner.
If he had been an innkeeper it would have been in his custody,
because he owed a duty to the guest. The question of particular
intent was never discussed at all."125 Likewise in commenting
on Sir Frederick Pollock's approval of the case on the theory
that there was no de facto control on the part of the shopkeeper
the learned Editor says: "It is hardly necessary to repeat that
this exceedingly interesting theory cannot be found in the judg-
ment itself and is, therefore, not a part of the ratio decidendi
of the case.''26 Without impliedly approving the theories which
Mr. Goodhart criticizes, it is submitted that he is here continu-
ing the error of assuming that a court must discuss a point or in
some other manner clearly indicate that it had the point in mind
before that point can be considered part of the doctrine of the
case. There never yet has been any judge wise enough to com-
prehend more than a few of the facts at a time that go to make
up the infinite number of facts that any simple case presents,
and a very small percentage of those comprehended are dis-
cussed. There are gaps in judicial decisions just as there are
gaps in statutes. When later judges or critics find facts or im-
plications of facts overlooked in a prior decision, if these are im-
portant enough to have changed the decision had they occurred
to the court, then the case is not to be decisive of those facts; if
on the other hand, these facts, though material, would not have
altered the decision, then the case is decisive of those facts. It is
quite another thing to pick out one fact in a decision as the de-
cisive fact and erect this fact into some sort of a "principle," as
Pollock, Holmes, Salmond, and others seem to do, that will be
decisive of all cases containing this crucial fact, regardless of
place, circumstance, and time.
Now what shall we say of Mr. Goodhart's version of the ratio
Op. cit. note 1 supra, p. 199. Cf. Tb., 203.
I b., p. 201.
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decidendi? What is meant here by "custody" is not at all clear.
It seems that the court uses the term in the broad sense to in-
clude possession. I am not sure in what sense Mr. Goodhart
uses the term. Certainly it is well known that "custody" is a
highly technical term meaning different things in different cir-
cumstances. Now if "owing a duty" is the criterion of custody
then how can the Bridges case fairly be said to be a decision on
custody at all, since the duty of the shopkeeper was not directly
in issue? Is it not just as enlightening to say there is no duty
because the shopkeeper did not have custody? When either is
decided the case is decided. In neither event do we have a rea-
son but merely a conclusion stated in two different ways. It
amounts to saying that the shopkeeper does not have custody be-
cause he does not have custody. This quaint old legal game of
"ring-around-the-rosy" with respect to decision and reasons for
decisions is the inevitable result of trying to decide cases "on
principle." Does it follow that if the defendant had been an inn-
keeper "it would, have been in his custody, because he owed a duty
to the true owner ?,,27 This is clearly dictum, for innkeeper facts
were not involved. Unless the parcel could be proved to be the
property of a guest it is extremely doubtful if a court would de-
prive the finder of any rights to the parcel. 2
I believe that Mr. Goodhart's criticism of Sir John Salmond's
explanation of the Bridges case and the Elwes case is perfectly
sound. Sir John is equally guilty with Mr. Goodhart and all the
writers whom he criticizes of beginning with an a priori concep-
tion of possession, as, one cannot have possession of a thing
without knowledge of the existence of the thing in question. Of
the Bridges case he says, "It was held that the plaintiff had a
good title to them as against the defendant. For the plaintiff
and not the defendant was the first to acquire possession of
them. The defendant had not the necessary animus, for he did
not know of their existence." 21, This, as Mr. Goodhart points
out, is too broad. So when Sir John comes to the Elwes case,
where the contest was between a finder-tenant and the lessor
Ib., p. 199.
Hamaker v. Blanchard (1879), 90 Pa. 377-money found by the servant
of an innkeeper in the parlor of the hotel.
Jurisprudence (7th ed.), p. 305.
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over a pre-historic boat found by the tenant in excavating in
construction of a gas holder, he is hard put to it to reconcile this
case with his pre-conceived notion of possession, so he grabs a
dictum from Chitty, J., in respect to a mere trespasser and
couples this with the theory that, "The tenants, though entitled
to excavate and remove the soil, were not entitled to remove any-
thing else." The implication is that when they took the boat
they became trespassers, and a finder-trespasser can have no
rights against the owner of the land upon which he has tres-
passed. Mr. Goodhart points out that Chitty, J., bases his deci-
sion specifically on the ground that the lessor was first in posses-
sion and said, "It make no difference, in the circumstances, that
the plaintiff was not aware of the existence of the boat."30 It
seems that a graver defect of the Salmond theory of trespass
here is that it cuts too deep: why not say that every finding on
the land of another is then a trespass? When you decide that
this is a trespass you again decide the case and your rationaliza-
tion is question-begging. When he comes to the Sharman case
I believe that Mr. Salmond points out one valuable consideration
of the case which he presents as the distinguishing feature,
namely, "if anyone finds a thing as the servant or agent of an-
other, he finds it not for himself, but for his employer." While
this is too broad, for reasons already stated, r cannot agree with
Mr. Goodhart that this explanation of the case is invalid because




Be it noted that I am not here concerned with the question of
the correctness of the decisions of any of these cases. I am now
merely interested in the assumptions of those who have discuss-
ed these cases, and especially those of Mr. Goodhart. Mr. Good-
hart submits that the element of "public access" is not part of the
doctrine of the Bridges case but he also submits that it should
not be for two reasons. First, "A shopkeeper invites the public
for the purpose of shopping; he intends to exclude them from
whatever is not necessary to accomplish this end * * * a
shopkeeper intends to possess everything in his shop just as
much as a private person intends to possess everything in his
Op. cit. note 1 supra, p. 204.
1lb., p. 206.
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room; in both cases there is the intent to exclude strangers from
the thing."3 2 Second, "It is difficult to say under what circum-
stances the public is invited and when it is excluded from a place.
Is the public invited to the doctor's consulting room, a solicitor's
office, a tailor's shop, a theater, a restaurant, or a store . . . .?3
As to the first of these reasons I do not see that Holmes and
Goodhart are in conflict; each is merely pointing out and stress-
ing competing elements that go into one of these finder cases.
The farther a dog is away from his bone or a bone the less keenly
he feels about another dog that picks up the bone. The prin-
ciple of "finders, keepers" seems to be deeply ingrained in dogs
as well as in men. Here we have a conflict between the feeling
involved in the extent of privileges enjoyed in the ownership of
land and the fundamental home-spun feeling of "finders, keep-
ers." It is submitted that both of these men are in error in
their tacit assumption that the "intent to exclude" or the "intent
not to exclude" is the conclusive element not only of this case but
of all cases involving the question of possession. Life is too
complex and variable to be ruled by such simple formulas, as Mr.
Holmes well knows.
As for the second objection, if there are certain practical con-
siderations why the public accessibility of the place where the
thing was found matters in the decision of a case, and the court
becomes conscious of these considerations, then in moving from
case to case the court will have no more difficulty in drawing this
line than any other line not already defined that the courts are
marking out. What is a public place is only difficult,3 4 as are
most questions in law, when considered in vacuo. The first
part of the answer is, Why do you want to know and what differ-
ence does it make?
I fear that I have already over-taxed the patience of the reader
and as our brothers on the other side have it, "To be everlasting
is not to be immortal," I must draw this rather sketchy and in-
formal discussion to a close with a few words on the "principles"
deduced from the three cases by Mr. Goodhart.
2 Ib., p. 199.
Ib., p. 200.
"I mean relatively difficult; for all legal decisions are difficult when in-
telligently based upon the many social interests involved and when a fore-
cast is made of the effects of the decision and all its by-products.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss1/2
THREE CASES ON POSSESSION 21
All of the principles listed, with the possible exception of the
second, it is submitted, are too broad, as a few illustrations will
readily show. Suppose a thief steals my silver and buries it in
your land. As between the thief and the finder the thief has
possession. So if I lose my silver on your land and it becomes
buried by the elements, as in the Sharman case, I would be con-
sidered as still in possession for purposes of larceny or against
you who negligently injured my property. It is not so clear that
a loser loses possession34a by losing his article. Again the pur-
poses of the inquiry, the relation of the parties, the circum-
stances of the case, etc., become important. This is illustrated
by the doctrine of "misplaced" property of many of the courts
of this country. 5 Suppose we assume that the Bridges case had
been decided for the shopkeeper I do not believe that it would
follow that if the purse had been found in an alley of which the
shopkeeper owned the fee and over which the public had an ease-
ment of right of way, that the shopkeeper would be entitled to
the purse. Other illustrations will readily occur to show that
the remaining principles are too broad.
Ready-made principles available at a moment's notice for set-
tling any kind of a legal problem and resolving any kind of a
doubt have long been the great ambition of lawyers. Such a
practice in medicine today is generally accepted as quackery.
But in law a hankering for certainty, born of timidity and nour-
ished by the love of authority, has led to the idea that the absence
of such a set of ready-made principles is equivalent to legal
chaos. Yet situations in which change and the unexpected en-
"a The confusion here arises in using the term in a non-technical sense.
"Durfee v. Jones (1877), 11 R. I. 588, 23 Am. Rep. 528; Loucks v. Gal-
logly (1892), 23 N. Y. S. 126; McAvoy Medina (1866), 93 Mass. (11 Al-
len) 548, 87 Am. Dec. 733; Silcott v. Louisville Trust Co. (1924), 205 Ky.
234, 265 S. W. 612, 23 A. L. R. 28; Kincade v. Eaton (1867), 98 Mass. 139,
98 Am. Dec. 142; Foster v. Fidelity Safe Dep. Co. (1915), 264 Mo. 89, 174
S. W. 376, L. R. A. 1916A 655. If the lost goods happen to be treasure
trove, without any apparent practical distinction, the courts of this country
seem to favor the finder and ignore both the doctrine of the superior rights
of the landowner and the doctrine of mislaid property: Vickery v. Hardin
(1922), 77 Ind. A. 558, 133 N. E. 922; Weeks v. Hacket (1908), 104 Me. 264,
71 A. 858; Danielson v. Roberts (1904), 44 Or. 108, 74 P. 913; Robertson v.
Ellis (1911), 58 Or. 219, 114 P. 100; Hutchmaker v. Harris' Adm. (1861),
88 Pa. St. 491, 80 Am. Dec. 502.
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ter are a challenge to intelligence to create new principles.
Jurisprudence must be a growing science if it is to be a science
at all, not merely because all truth has not yet been appropriated
by the mind of man, but because life is a moving affair in which
old legal truth ceases to apply. Principles are methods of in-
quiry and forecast which require verification by the case; and
the time-honored effort to assimilate law to mathematics is only
a way of bolstering up old rules and principles or putting new
ones in disguise on the throne of the old. Principles exist as,
hypotheses with which to experiment. Lightly to disregard
them is the height of foolishness. The choice is not between
throwing away previously developed principles and sticking ob-
stinately by them. The intelligent alternative is to revise, adapt,
expand and alter them. The problem is one of continuous, vital
readaptation. Every case may be a unique case. 3
If Bridges v. Hawkesworth was incorrectly decided it is not so
because some a priori conception of possession has been violated
or because of the dictate of any rule of logic. 37 What can we say
more of possession than that it is a group of operative facts to
which certain legal consequences attach? What operative facts
will be necessary to constitute "possession" will depend first up-
on the purpose of the inquiry, i.e., what legal consequences are
sought to be attached, and secondly upon the judge's sense of
justice, his sense of the mores of his time and place, that is, on
his personal background and training, or, as the behaviorists
have it, upon his "behavior patterns." In a word the decisions
will always be pragmatic. The reasons a court gives for its de-
cisions will always be "good reasons," but the "real reasons"
will seldom appear and when they do appear they will appear
shamefacedly. The court is more likely to search legal theories
and principles to back up a decision it has already arrived at be-
fore the argument is half finished than to look to them for the
purpose of determining the decision. In the last analysis, all
decisions involving novel or doubtful factors, are based upon the
John Dewey, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT (1921), Chapter on "The
Nature of Principles," pp. 238 ff. The paragraph in the text is a para-
phrase of a few paragraphs found in Dewey.
' The term "logic" is here used in the old syllogistic sense and not in the
empirical sense that treats all premises as hypothetical.
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court's conception of the considerations of policy involved; or,
as Mr. Holmes put it, "on legislative considerations."38 Here we
have such factors as the extent of rights in land and the feeling
of control over things closely associated with land and the feel-
ing of finders, keepers; the protection of chattel owners, i.e.,
likelihood of the return of chattels to the owners; the penalizing
of trespassers; the discouraging of infidelity of servants; and,
perhaps improperly, the relative financial worth of the finder
and the landowner, etc., etc. This is the stuff that enters into a
decision of this kind. Here is the real battlefield of human in-
terests. Other stuff should enter, such as facts and figures show-
ing the relative claims of certain competing social policies. My
excuse for laboring this point is not that many people disagree
with this thesis in theory, but that this theory of legal technical
concepts is continually ignored3 9 in practice in court opinions
and legal literature to the great confusion of both writer and
reader, and that scarcely anything is being done on either side of
the Atlantic towards a scientific study of this non-vocal behavior
of judges. Most of our legal literature and much of our legal
education is beside the point. If I understand him correctly, I
fail to discern more than the faintest shadows of signs that indi-
cate that Mr. Goodhart is even remotely conscious of these the-
ories as a realistic description of legal concepts and of what is
taking place in our court rooms.
What I have tried, above all, to point out is the uncertain ele-
' THE COMMON LAW (1881), 37. "The language of Judicial decision is
mainly the language of logic. And the logical method and the form flatter
that longing for certainty and repose which is in every human mind. But
certainty generally is an illusion." Per Mr. Justice Holmes, CoLLEcTmD
PAp RS (1921), p. 181.
" Most of our notable contributors on the subject of possession, including
Bentham, Maitland, Ames, Holmes, Salmond, and Pollock and Wright seem
to have recognized in varying degrees that possession is a double-decked
affair, made up of a sub-stratum of series of factual (i.e., non-legal) ele-
ments below and of series of different legal consequences above. Some of
these consequences are: The rise of certain possessory remedies such as
trespass, trover, replevin, detinue, etc.; the rise of certain rights, privileges,
powers and immunities generally accorded to a finder, to a disseisor, to an
occupier of unowned goods or land, to a donee, to a purchaser, to a patentee,
to an inheritor or legatee, to the owner of the offspring of animals; and
criminal liability under larceny or liquor or counterfeiting statutes, etc., etc.
A careful examination of the cases will disclose, it is confidently believed,
that nearly all of these legal consequences or groups of legal consequences
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ments in a ratio decidendi which is not so much a fact in the
sense of a record of past events as an intelligent guess'as to
future events. To look for a ratio decidendi in the former sense
is out-of-date, misleading, and fruitless. If it is true that the
path of human progress is strewn with dead principles and dead
concepts then I venture to suggest that the effort to find the
ratio decidendi of a case will soon be viewed in the same light as
a physiologist trying to locate the "soul."
demand for their occasion widely varying groups of operative facts. Hence
any a priori rules, generalizations, or principles are almost sure to be non-
descriptive of what is implied by the term possession unless half of our data
is ignored. At best these principles could represent only a common denomi-
nator of many possessions, all differing as differ the purposes which give
rise to the inquiries. It would be hardly safe to assume that this common
denominator would be an adequate test of what constitutes possession in
new or doubtful cases. New cases and legislation would demand constant
revision of these principles and there would be a constant danger of mis-
using these rules as measuring rods and not as hypotheses. Yet in spite of
these facts it is remarkable that all of the above writers have constructed
a priori principles of their own and have ignored what they have labored to
demonstrate. This is notably true of Mr. Justice Holmes in his treatment
of possession in his CoM1moN LAW, pp. 206 ff. Compare Joseph W. Bing-
ham, LEGAL POSSESSION, 13 Mich. L. Rev. 535, 623, for a very searching and
critical analysis of possession.
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